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COMMENT
Does a Pharmacist Have the Right to Refuse to
Fill a Prescription for Birth Control?
I. INTRODUCTION
Neil Noesen refused to fill Amanda Phiede's prescription for birth
control pills because he feared doing so might cause him to suffer "spiri-
tual pain."' Karen Brauer lied to a customer that her birth control pills
were not in stock because she believes such drugs cause abortions, and
filling the prescription would have violated her religious beliefs.2 Amer-
ican women who have long assumed they have a right to have their
legally valid prescriptions for birth control pills filled at their local phar-
macies, without hassles and without questions about their intent in using
such pills, are finding that exercise of this presumed right is more diffi-
cult than expected.3 The war against reproductive choice is being waged
on a surprising new front-the pharmacy counter-as an increasing
number of pharmacists are refusing to fill prescriptions for oral contra-
ceptives because of their religious or moral beliefs.4
Kmart fired Karen Brauer, the pharmacist who lied to a customer
that her birth control pills were out of stock, when she would not agree
to dispense lawfully prescribed medications.5 Brauer has since founded
Pharmacists for Life International [PFLI],6 an organization that advo-
1. Todd Richmond, Pharmacist Facing Disciplinary Hearing: He Refused to Fill UW-Stout
Student's Birth Control Pill Prescription, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Oct. 12, 2004, at B 1.
2. Dennis M. Mahoney, Prescription for Dispute: Can Pharmacist Refuse Service for
Reasons of Conscience?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2001, at IE.
3. Twelve million American women use prescription hormonal contraceptives, making them
the second most popular form of birth control after sterilization. Jeff McDonald, More Health
Professionals Balk at Giving Birth Control: Refusal to Prescribe, Dispense Increases; Moral
Grounds Cited, SAN DEGo UNION-TRIB., Aug. 8, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR
16989368.
4. See Caroline Bollinger, Access Denied, PREVENTION, Aug. 2004, at 150, available at 2004
WLNR 13812854; Jill McGivering, Pill Propelled into Abortion Debate, BBC NEws, Sept. 13,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3652462.stm ("At first these were just isolated cases [of
pharmacists refusing to fill birth control pill prescriptions], mostly in the Midwest. But recently
they have increased dramatically.").
5. James F. Sweeney, May a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill a Prescription?, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 5, 2004, at El, available at 2004 WLNR 333123.
6. Karen L. Brauer, Editorial, Pharmacists Put Patients' Interests First, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT.,
Oct. 14, 2004, at 19A, available at 2004 WLNR 6339466.
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cates for a legally protected right for pharmacists to refuse to dispense
oral contraceptives. 7  PFLI argues that oral contraceptives cause abor-
tions because oral contraceptives are not always successful at preventing
fertilization.8 Instead, oral contraceptives may damage the lining of the
uterus, preventing the fertilized egg from implanting on the uterine
wall.9 This is known as the "post-fertilization" effect.'I Thus, PFLI and
other pro-life opponents of the pill argue that oral contraceptives can
have the abortifacient (or pregnancy-ending) effect of preventing the fer-
tilized egg from implanting." PFLI's argument is particularly contro-
versial in its break from the established definition of conception as
implantation of the fertilized egg, rather than mere fertilization.' 2 Addi-
tionally, there is a lack of scientific evidence proving that the "post-
fertilization" effect takes place.' 3
So, what happens to a pharmacist who refuses to dispense a legally
valid prescription for oral contraceptives? Currently, the outcome
depends on where the incident takes place. Some states have "con-
science clauses" that protect the pharmacist, as advocated by PLFI,14
and others do not. In Ohio, Kmart fired Karen Brauer for her refusal to
fill birth control prescriptions, and, in part as a response to the attention
Brauer's ongoing lawsuit against Kmart has brought the issue, the state
is considering extending conscience clause legislation to pharmacists.
15
Ohio legislation already protects doctors, nurses, and other health care
workers who refuse to participate in abortions.'
6
In Texas, CVS did not reprimand a pharmacist who refused to fill a
prescription for an oral contraceptive because CVS has a "refuse and
7. Pharmacists for Life Int'l, Why a Conscience Clause is a Must... NOW!, http://www.
pfli.org/main.php?pfli=conscienceclausefaq (last visited Jan.11, 2005).
8. Pharmacists for Life Int'l, The Pill - How It Works and Fails, http://www.pfli.org/faq-oc.
html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Caroline Bollinger, The Post-Fertilization Effect: Fact or Fiction?, PREVErION,
Aug. 2004, at 153, available at http://www.prevention.com/article/0,,sl-l-93-35-4166-1,00.html.
11. Pharmacists for Life Int'l, supra note 8.
12. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman Is Pregnant, THE
GUTrMACHER REPORT ON PuB. POLICY (The Alan Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), May 2005,
at 7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/2/grO80207.pdf ("[M]edical experts-
notably the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)-agree that the
establishment of a pregnancy takes several days and is not completed until a fertilized egg is
implanted in the lining of the woman's uterus. (In fact, according to the ACOG, the term
'conception' properly means implantation.)").
13. Bollinger, supra note 10 (noting that even the vice president of the American Association
of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists admits there is no proof of the post-fertilization
effect).
14. Pharmacists for Life Int'l, supra note 7.
15. Mahoney, supra note 2.
16. See Sweeney, supra note 5.
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refer" policy that allows pharmacists to refer patients to another pharma-
cist at the same location or another store rather than dispense medica-
tions that offend their beliefs.' 7  While the Texas Pharmaceutical
Association publicly supports the CVS policy of providing for pharma-
cists' conscientious objections, Kirsten Arnold, chief counsel for the
Texas Pharmacy Board, stated that "the board would be concerned with
a refusal to fill a prescription" because "[t]here's nothing in [Texas] law
that says a pharmacist can refuse to fill a prescription on ethical
grounds." 8
In Georgia, long-standing pharmacy board regulations that allow
pharmacists to refuse to dispense medications for ethical or moral rea-
sons protected a pharmacist who refused to refill a birth control prescrip-
tion because she did not believe in birth control.' 9
In contrast, Wisconsin pharmacist Neil Noesen faced a potential
reprimand and the possible loss of his license for his refusal to fill a birth
control prescription.2" Noesen appeared at a disciplinary hearing in
October 2004 for his conduct, which included not only his refusal to
dispense the prescription, but also his refusal to transfer the prescription
to another pharmacy or return the prescription to the customer.2' Chris-
topher Klein, a spokesman for the State's Department of Regulation and
Licensing, stated it was unlikely that Noesen's license would be
revoked,22 despite Noesen's obstruction of the customer's ability to
obtain oral contraceptives that had been legally prescribed.
'his article will examine this growing trend of pharmacists refusing
to dispense oral contraceptives, and consider whether such pharmacists
should have a protected right to base refusals on their personal beliefs.
This comment will also discuss this phenomenon's potential threat to
reproductive choice, arguing that the pharmacist's right to follow his
conscience must yield to a woman's privacy right to make her own
reproductive choices. Part II will trace the historical development of the
right to use contraceptives and the subsequent limitations on that right.
17. Mahoney, supra note 2; Press Release, Planned Parenthood Fed'n. of Am., Inc., Planned
Parenthood Demands CVS Action on Birth Control Prescriptions (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.
plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/media/pressreleases/pr-04033 1 -birth-control-cvs.
xml.
18. George Schwarz, Amarillo, Texas, Pharmacists Say They Won't Withhold Contraception,
AMARiLLO GLOBE NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 18094174.
19. Editorial, Our Opinions: The 50 States of Denial Pharmacists' Ability to Reject
Prescriptions on Personal Grounds Violates Consumers' Rights, ATLANTA J.-CONsT., Oct. 14,
2004, at A18, available at 2004 WLNR 6339477.
20. Richmond, supra note 1.
21. Charisse Jones, Druggists Refuse to Give Out Pill, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2004, at 3A,
available at 2004 WLNR 6899597.
22. Id.
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Part III will examine the argument for allowing pharmacists the right to
refuse to fill prescriptions that are contrary to their belief systems. Part
IV attempts to determine whose right should prevail, the patient's right
to use contraceptives, or the pharmacist's right to refuse to fill prescrip-
tions on moral, ethical, or religious grounds.
II. THE RIGHT TO USE CONTRACEPTIVES
A. History of the Right
The Food and Drug Administration first approved the use of oral
contraceptives, commonly known as "birth control pills," for use as con-
traceptives in 1960.23 However, women did not have an unimpeded
right to use such drugs to control their fertility until the Supreme Court
struck down, as unconstitutional, state laws infringing upon that right.
Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut24 in 1965, the Court estab-
lished a married person's right to use contraception. 5 In Griswold, the
Executive Director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a
medical doctor appealed their criminal convictions under Connecticut
statutes that forbade any person from using, or aiding another person in
using, "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception. 26 The Court noted that the appellants were con-
victed for the "information, instruction, and medical advice" they pro-
vided to married persons, a fact it found important because the law
"operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their
physician's role in one aspect of that relation."27 The Court found the
Connecticut statute unconstitutional as an impermissible intrusion by the
State into the marital relationship, which is a "relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guar-
antees."28 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas asked, "[w]ould we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."29 How-
ever, the right of privacy upon which the Court relied is a right not
specified but implied within the First, Fourth, and Fifth amendments to
23. Suzanne White Junod, FDA's Approval of the First Oral Contraceptive, Enovid, UPDATE
(U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Rockville, Md.), July-Aug. 1998, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/
makinghistory/enovid.htmi.
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. Id. at 485-86.
26. Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
27. Id. at 480, 482.
28. Id. at 485.
29. Id. at 485-86.
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the Constitution,30 and the Griswold case appears to limit that right to
the marital relationship.
The Supreme Court indirectly expanded the right to use contracep-
tives to unmarried people in Eisenstadt v. Baird.3 At issue in Eisen-
stadt was a Massachusetts state law that made it illegal for single people
to obtain contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy.3" The
Court found two possible legislative aims that were promoted by the
statute: first, the protection of morals through the regulation of "'the
private sexual lives of single persons,' "3 and second, the prevention of
health problems from physical side effects of contraception. 34  The
Court rejected these claims as unreasonable given the lack of deterrent
effect in preventing premarital sex,3 5 and the overly broad sweep of the
statute with respect to contraceptives that pose no hazard to health.36
Having declared that the stated rationales for the statute were not reason-
able, the Court stated that "whatever the rights of the individual to
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the
unmarried and the married alike."37 Therefore, the Court held that the
statute violated the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The Court reserved the ques-
tion of whether Griswold constitutes an absolute bar to state prohibition
on the distribution of contraceptives, because it based its decision on the
differential treatment between married and unmarried individuals.39
But, the Court did state that the Griswold right of privacy in the marital
relationship is the right of privacy of individuals "to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."4
The Court cleared up the ambiguity left by its decision in Eisen-
stadt in its decision in Carey v. Population Services International.4 In
30. See id. at 484-85; Karen Flax, Comment, Women's Rights and the Proposed Family
Protection Act, 36 U. MIAMl L. REV. 141, 145 (1981) ("Justice Douglas admitted that this zone of
privacy was not specified in the Constitution, but found the right within the 'penumbras' of
explicit constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment's right of association, the fourth
amendment's recognition of privacy in the home, and the fifth amendment's guarantee of freedom
from self-incrimination.").
31. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
32. Id. at 441-42.
33. Id. at 442 (quoting Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 448-49.
36. Id. at 451-52.
37. Id. at 453.
38. Id. at 454-55.
39. Id. at 452-54.
40. Id. at 453.
41. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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Carey, the Court indicated that Griswold must be read "in light of its
progeny" - Eisenstadt, Roe v. Wade,4 2 and Whalen v. Roe4 3 - to mean
that "the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."'  The Court noted
that "regulations that burden an individual's right to decide to prevent
conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the
means of effectuating that decision" can only be justified by a "compel-
ling state interest" and "'must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.'"" The Court stated that the compel-
ling state interest test applied to such regulations "not because there is an
independent fundamental 'right of access to contraceptives,' but because
such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right
of decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation
of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade."4 6
The Court in Carey held that by "[l]imiting the distribution of non-
prescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists," the New York stat-
ute in question "clearly imposes a significant burden on the right of the
individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to do so" and serves no
compelling state interest to justify imposing such a burden.47 Four Jus-
tices also found that the statute's limitation on the distribution of non-
prescription contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen was an
unjustified intrusion by the State into the privacy rights of minors, as the
"right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation
extends to minors as well as to adults. 48
B. Limits on the Right
As outlined in the discussion above, Griswold and its progeny
established that individuals have the right to use contraceptives. In Pop-
ulation Services International v. Wilson,49 the predecessor to Carey, the
Southern District of New York recognized access to contraceptives as
"an aspect of the right to privacy, that is, a right encompassed within the
personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
44. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
45. Id. at 688 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 155).
46. Id. at 688-89.
47. Id. at 689-90.
48. Id. at 693-94 (noting that Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) invalidated state laws requiring parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion and
foreclosed "the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to
minors").
49. 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Amendment."5 However, this view was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Carey, which noted that there is no fundamental right of access to
contraceptives, only the right to make decisions regarding childbearing,
and therefore to use contraceptives.
The recognition of a constitutionally protected right to make deci-
sions affecting procreation begs the questions whether there is any guar-
antee of access to contraception. Although the Supreme Court has not
directly settled this question, one can draw inferences about the limits on
the right of access to contraception by examining court decisions regard-
ing the right of access to abortions and insurance coverage for prescrip-
tion contraceptives.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional
Texas laws criminalizing abortion, stating that the constitutional right of
privacy encompassed a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.5"
However, Roe states that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is
not absolute, but is subject to the State's interests "in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life."53 As a result, Roe limits the right to an abortion by stating that,
prior to the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman and her
doctor may make the decision to abort free of state regulation, after the
first trimester the State may regulate abortion "in ways that are reasona-
bly related to maternal health," and after the fetus become viable, the
State may proscribe abortion except where medically necessary to pre-
serve the health or life of the mother.5 4 Consequently, Roe permits leg-
islative limits on a woman's access to abortion as a means of effecting
reproductive choice by allowing states to circumscribe when, and under
what circumstances, a woman can obtain an abortion.
The Court gave substance to the extent of the State's interest in
protecting the health of the mother and the life of the fetus in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.56 In Casey, the
Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute restricting abortion by imposing a
24-hour waiting period, informed consent requirements, and reporting
and recordkeeping by abortion providers.57 The Court decided that the
50. Id. at 331.
51. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id. at 164-65.
55. See id.
56. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
57. Id. at 882, 887, 900. The Court also upheld the statute's definition of a medical
emergency (which is important because a finding of a medical emergency obviates the need to
comply with the waiting period requirement), but struck down the spousal notification
requirement as an undue burden. Id. at 880, 893-94.
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appropriate test for such regulations is the "undue burden" test, stating
that "[n]ot all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a preg-
nancy will be undue."58 The Court stated that the State has the authority
to "enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking
an abortion," but that "[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seek-
ing an abortion impose an undue burden on the right [to choose an
abortion].'
The Court further limited access to abortion as a means of effecting
reproductive choice in Maher v. Roe,6" where it held that the State could
limit use of Medicaid funds to medically necessary abortions without
intruding upon a woman's constitutional right of choice.6 On the same
day, the Court held in Beal v. Doe62 that Title XIX of the Social Security
Act does not require a state Medicaid program to fund elective abor-
tions. 63 In Maher, the Court explained that "[w]e certainly are not
unsympathetic to the plight of an indigent woman who desires an abor-
tion, but 'the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every
social and economic ill.' "" The effect of these decisions is to limit
access to elective abortions to women who can privately afford them,
unless the State decides otherwise.
The development of conscience clause legislation soon after the
Roe v. Wade decision further constrained access to abortion, by allowing
medical providers to refuse to participate in abortions and other proce-
dures that violate their beliefs.65 The first such legislation was the fed-
eral Church Amendment, which prohibited courts and public officials
from requiring health care providers receiving governmental funding to
provide sterilizations or abortions. 66 The Church Amendment also pro-
tected health providers from reprisal in the workplace "for either per-
forming or refusing to perform these services. '"67 The recent trend of
conscience clauses that allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense medica-
tions on moral or religious grounds, including a South Dakota law
passed in 1998, similarly threatens access to contraceptives.68 In the
58. Id. at 876.
59. Id. at 878.
60. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
61. Id. at 466, 478.
62. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
63. Id. at 447.
64. Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
65. See Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saying Roe is Not Enough: When Religion
Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725 (2004).
66. Id. at 746 n.152.
67. Id. at 746.
68. Susan A. Cohen, Objections, Confusion Among Pharmacists Threaten Access to
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absence of conscience clause legislation, most state pharmacy boards
require pharmacists to dispense all medications for which the patient has
a legally valid prescription.69 Part III of this article will examine these
state conscience clauses more closely.
Another source for determining the contours of the right of access
to contraception is case law regarding insurance coverage for prescrip-
tion contraceptives. A trend toward legally-mandated insurance cover-
age for prescription contraceptives suggests that the right to use
contraceptives may include a right of access.70 Currently, only twenty-
two states require that health insurers' prescription drug coverage
include coverage of prescription contraceptives.7"
For instance, California has adopted the Women's Contraception
Equity Act (WCEA), which does not require that employers offer
employees coverage for prescription drugs, but if the employer chooses
to offer such coverage, the coverage must extend to prescription contra-
ceptives." At the same time, the WCEA allows religious institutions to
opt out of such insurance coverage on the basis that those contraceptive
methods are contrary to the employer's religious tenets.73 As a result,
the conscience clause in the statute allows a "religious employer" to
offer drug policies that exclude coverage for contraceptives. 74 However,
in Catholic Charities, the California Supreme Court found that the plain-
tiff did not qualify as a "religious employer" because it did not meet the
criteria established in the statutory definition. 75  Therefore, as an
employer not exempted by the conscience clause, if Catholic Charities
provides any drug coverage as part of its employee health insurance
plan, it must provide coverage for prescription contraceptives.
Access to prescription contraceptives also may be protected under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.7 6 Under Title VII, an employer may not discrimi-
Emergency Contraception, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POLICY (The Alan Guttmacher
Inst., New York, N.Y.), June 1999, at 1, 3, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr02/3/
gr020301 .html
69. Id. at 2-3.
70. See generally Kate Spota, Note, In Good Conscience: The Legal Trend to Include
Prescription Contraceptives in Employer Insurance Plans and Catholic Charities' "Conscience
Clause" Objection, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1081 (2003).
71. THE ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
CONTRACEPTIVES (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-
ICC.pdf.
72. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 85 P.3d
67, 74 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 53 (2004).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 76.
76. See generally Cheryl A. Danner, Prescription Contraceptives: Educate Yourself on the
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nate against a female employee "affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions" with respect to employment conditions,
including fringe benefits.77 An Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) decision in December 2000 found that a self-insured
employer violated Title VII by failing to cover prescription contracep-
tives as part of an employee health insurance plan.78 EEOC decisions,
although not binding on courts, serve as guides for courts and are usu-
ally viewed with deference.79 In fact, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,
80
a federal court adopted the EEOC's view and held that omission of con-
traceptives from prescription coverage discriminates against women
under Title VII.8 '
Given the case law on the right to abortion and insurance coverage
of contraceptives, it is still unclear whether there is any meaningful right
of access to contraceptives. Certainly, the case law firmly establishes a
right to use oral contraceptives, but without a right of access, the ques-
tion remains whether that right is meaningful. Roe v. Wade established a
woman's right to choose an abortion, but as discussed above, later cases
limited that right, particularly in access to abortion, by allowing states to
opt out of paying for abortions for the indigent and allowing providers to
opt out of providing abortions through refusal clauses. 82  However,
recent cases on employer insurance plans suggest that there is some right
of access to oral contraceptives, or at least a right of access to the means
to pay for oral contraceptives.
III. THE PHARMACIST'S RIGHTS
Does a pharmacist have a legal right to refuse to dispense oral con-
traceptives? If the pharmacist refuses, does the patient have any legal
recourse? Does the employer have the power to require the pharmacist
to fill all legally prescribed medications, or to fire a pharmacist who
refuses to fill certain prescriptions? Can the pharmacy licensing board
take disciplinary action against the pharmacist for the refusal? What
legal right does the pharmacist have to refuse to dispense oral contracep-
tives? In analyzing the legal rights of the pharmacist, I will discuss the
potential ramifications the pharmacist risks in refusing to dispense oral
Discrimination You May Be Suffering Because You Work for a Private Educational Institution, 31
J.L. & EDUC. 513 (2002).
77. Id. at 514 (quoting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1964)).
78. Id. at 513.
79. Id.
80. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
81. Id. at 1275-76.
82. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
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contraceptives, and the defenses the pharmacist has against those
ramifications.
A. The Patient's Options
When a pharmacist refuses to dispense oral contraceptives, the
patient is the first person affected by this choice and may complain to
the pharmacist's employer or to the pharmacist's licensing board. The
patient may even feel her constitutional right to privacy and right to use
contraceptives have been interfered with by the pharmacist's refusal.
Part II of this comment discussed the evolution of the constitutional
right to use contraceptives, including the limitations on the right of
access. A patient who attempts to raise a constitutional challenge
against a pharmacist who refuses to fill a prescription for oral contracep-
tives faces another hurdle: The pharmacist's refusal does not constitute
state action, so the patient has no private cause of action to assert against
the pharmacist. As the Supreme Court stated in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.,83 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"offers no shield" against "private conduct, 'however discriminatory or
wrongful.""' Even if the pharmacist exercised the choice to refuse
under a conscience clause or provision of the state pharmacist licensing
board, the Court's decision in Jackson makes clear that the pharmacist's
"exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes
from [the pharmacist] and not from the State, does not make [the phar-
macist's] action in doing so 'state action' for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'8 5
B. The Employer's Options: Employment-at-Will Versus Title VII
A patient who is refused service by a pharmacist is likely to com-
plain to pharmacy management. In response to such complaints, the
pharmacist's employer may wish to discipline the pharmacist, require
the pharmacist to agree to dispense all valid prescriptions in the future
(subject to health and safety concerns), or even terminate the employ-
ment of a pharmacist who refuses to comply with this requirement.
Does the employer have the right to take these steps to discipline a phar-
macist who, for reasons related to conscience, refuses to dispense oral
contraceptives?
Under the employment-at-will doctrine, "[m]anagement can dis-
charge for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all."86 Under this
83. 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
84. Id. at 349 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
85. Id. at 357.
86. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956).
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doctrine, pharmacy management faces no negative legal repercussions
for demoting or discharging a pharmacist who refuses to fill valid pre-
scriptions. However, most states recognize an exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine when the employee's discharge conflicts with a
recognized public policy.87 In such cases, the discharged employee can
assert a claim of wrongful discharge against the employer.88
In the case of a refusing pharmacist, a wrongful discharge claim
might not provide protection, because such a claim depends upon
whether the state in which the pharmacist was discharged recognizes the
right to conscientious refusal as a public policy.89 Generally, the public
policy exception has been limited to four cases: when the employee is
discharged for "'refusing to engage in an illegal activity at the behest of
the employer; exercising a public duty; asserting a legal right or privi-
lege; or whistleblowing."90 None of these categories protects a pharma-
cist who refuses to fill a prescription on moral or religious grounds.
Furthermore, pharmacy management can argue that a refusing pharma-
cist was not fired for following his conscience, but for refusing to per-
form his job duties, and thus behaving in a manner that conflicts with the
pharmacy's business objectives. 9'
A stronger argument for a refusing pharmacist exists under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, which provides that employers may not
discriminate against employees on the basis of their religion. 92 Thus,
Title VII might provide some protection to pharmacists who refuse to
fill prescriptions for oral contraceptives because of a conflict with their
religious beliefs.
Indeed, for refusing pharmacists of some faiths, their religious
belief that all artificial birth control is wrong is their rationale for refus-
ing to dispense oral contraceptives. For example, the only birth control
allowed by the Catholic faith is natural family planning, such as use of
the rhythm method.93
87. See Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a
Pharmacist's Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 77, 95 (2002-03).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 96 (quoting Mark Brossman & Laurie C. Malkin, Beyond the Implied Contract: The
Public Policy Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Other
Limitations on an Employer's Discretion in the At-Will Setting, 600 PRACTICING L. INST. 587, 594
(1999)).
91. See id. at 95.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000).
93. William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations upon Autonomous Moral
Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 510 (2001); see also
Spota, supra note 70, at 1084 ("Pope Paul VI's Humanae Vitae, or 'Of Human Life,' written in
1968, confirmed the Church's ban on artificial means of contraception.").
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Other pharmacists who refuse to dispense oral contraceptives do so
because they believe that oral contraceptives cause abortions in certain
cases, and their religious beliefs prohibit them from aiding women in
obtaining abortions.94 These pharmacists, and other opponents of oral
contraceptives, postulate that oral contraceptives do not always prevent
ovulation, therefore allowing fertilization to occur, and that oral contra-
ceptives prevent the fertilized ovum from implanting on the uterine
wall.95 Since these pharmacists also believe that fertilization of the
ovum is in fact the beginning of pregnancy,96 this "post-fertilization
effect" of oral contraceptives is thus a form of abortion.9 7
Given the religious rationales that motivate some pharmacists'
refusals to fill prescriptions for oral contraceptives, it would not be diffi-
cult for such a pharmacist to establish a prima facie case of religious
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimina-
tion, a pharmacist who is disciplined or fired for his refusal to fill pre-
scriptions for oral contraceptives would only have to demonstrate that he
had a bona fide religious belief in conflict with his employer's require-
ment that he fill all valid prescriptions (subject to health and safety con-
cerns), including oral contraceptives, that he informed his employer of
his belief, and that he was discharged for failing to comply with the
conflicting requirement.98 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that it cannot reasonably accommodate the employee's needs with-
out undue hardship. 99
While Title VII requires an employer to make "reasonable accom-
modations" for an employee's religious beliefs, the employer can defend
his decision not to accommodate if the accommodation would place an
undue hardship on the employer's business.' In Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 01 the Supreme Court held that requiring an employer
"to bear more than a de minimis cost" to accommodate an employee's
94. See Bollinger, supra note 10.
95. Id. Mainstream experts estimate that ovulation occurs approximately two to three percent
of the time in women taking oral contraceptives. Id.
96. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defines pregnancy as
beginning with implantation on the uterine wall. Id.
97. Id.
98. Brener v. Diagnostic Cir. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1982).
99. Id.
100. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ej) (2000) (defining religion as including "all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." (emphasis added)).
101. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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religious beliefs "is an undue hardship." 10 2 In that case, the employee's
religious beliefs required him to observe the Sabbath on Saturdays.
Trans World Airlines was unable to accommodate Hardison's request
for Saturdays off without either incurring increased costs, or requiring
other employees to trade shifts with him, in violation of the established
seniority system. 103 The Court held that the employer was not required
to ignore the seniority system that allowed other employees to refuse to
trade schedules with the plaintiff, to incur an impairment to the depart-
ment's functions due to the employee's absence on Saturdays, or to
incur the additional cost of paying overtime wages to another
employee."°4 All of these alternatives would have imposed an undue
hardship on the employer. 105
Similarly, in Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital,10 6 the Fifth Cir-
cuit applied the undue hardship test in a case where an Orthodox Jewish
pharmacist was discharged by the employer hospital because he refused
to work from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday.10 7 The Brener court
found that the alternatives suggested by the plaintiff, including hiring a
substitute pharmacist and operating without the plaintiff, would impose
more than a de minimis cost on the employer.1 0 8 The court also found
that Brener's preferred solution-having the supervisor direct other
employees to trade shifts with Brener-imposed an undue hardship on
the employer because prior shift changes resulted in decreased morale
among other employees.
10 9
As in Trans World Airlines and Brener, accommodation of a phar-
macist's conscientious objection to filling prescriptions for oral contra-
ceptives would impose an undue hardship on employer pharmacies. In
his article calling for greater conscience clause legislation, Donald W.
Herbe analogizes the proposed accommodations in Brener to the poten-
tial accommodations a pharmacy can make for a refusing pharmacist,
and concludes that Title VII protection is insufficient." 10 For example, a
pharmacy could be required to have an additional pharmacist on duty
during the objecting pharmacist's shifts, thus ensuring that there is
always a pharmacist available who will fill prescriptions for drugs the
accommodated pharmacist finds religiously objectionable."' If the
102. Id. at 84.
103. Id. at 76-77.
104. Id. at 82-85.
105. Id.
106. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 143-44.
108. Id. at 146-47.
109. Id.
110. Herbe, supra note 87, at 94-95.
111. Id.
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pharmacy would normally have only one pharmacist on duty, such an
accommodation would clearly result in an undue economic hardship to
the employer. '1 2 However, even a pharmacy that normally has more
than one pharmacist on duty runs the risk of experiencing decreased
employee morale if the employer requires other pharmacists to fill "mor-
ally controversial" prescriptions. 1 3 This is particularly burdensome if
another pharmacist has moral objections to filling such prescriptions, but
elects to put his professional duty to patients above his personal con-
science. 14 A court applying the undue hardship test in such a situation
would likely find that decreased employee morale poses a sufficiently
undue hardship as to excuse the pharmacy employer from accommodat-
ing the religious objections of the refusing pharmacist."1 5
Some pharmacists object so strongly to oral contraceptives that
even referral to another pharmacist or pharmacy is objectionable as "no
more than passive participation in the activity they initially refused to
actively assist."' 1 6 In such a case, the burden on the pharmacy employer
is even greater, since unsatisfied patients are likely to feel the pharmacy
itself is refusing to assist them, rather than the pharmacist acting alone.
A pharmacist who refuses to refer a valid prescription for reasons of
conscience would be unlikely to find any protection in Title VIl's pro-
scriptions against religious discrimination, as the necessary accommoda-
tion (allowing the pharmacist to turn away, rather than refer, customers)
imposes undue hardships upon the employer.
C. The Licensing Board's Disciplinary -Powers
Pharmacists in most states are regulated by state pharmacy boards
created by statutes. 1 7 Under these statutes, state pharmacy boards may
have the authority to censure a pharmacist for refusing to fill a prescrip-
tion for oral contraceptives, or for refusing to transfer the prescription to
another pharmacist or pharmacy. 1 8 For example, under the West Vir-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 95.
114. Id.
115. See generally Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1982).
116. Herbe, supra note 87, at 89.
117. Id. at 92.
118. See id. ("Each state's statute and regulations generally designate the offenses for which a
pharmacist may be subject to disciplinary action, and further what action the state board may take
against the pharmacist. For example, in Ohio the state board 'may revoke, suspend, limit, place
on probation, or refuse to grant or renew an identification card [license], or may impose a
monetary penalty .... ' (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.16 (2004))); Marilyn Gardner,
Pharmacists' Moral Beliefs vs. Women's Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004,
at 11 (stating that pharmacist Neil Noesen, who refused to fill or transfer a customer's
prescription, was to "appear before a court commissioner in Madison, Wis., to face a disciplinary
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ginia Code, pharmacists are required to fill any prescription order unless
there is a valid reason for the pharmacist's inability to do so."I9  If the
pharmacist refuses to fill a prescription for oral contraceptives, he is
required to document a valid reason for his refusal. The state pharmacy
board would review the pharmacist's reason for refusal and determine
whether the pharmacist violated the code. t20
In a number of states, however, a pharmacist has a duty to refuse to
dispense a prescription when doing so would conflict with his profes-
sional judgment. 2' Similarly, the American Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion's ("APhA") policy calls for pharmacists to refuse to dispense
medications when doing so would conflict with their professional judg-
ment. Nonetheless, the APhA recognizes that this policy does not
address refusals based on the pharmacist's moral or personal objec-
tions, 2 2 indicating that similar state policies do not protect pharmacists
who refuse to fill prescriptions based on conscience. In 1998, the
APhA's Policy Committee recommended that the APhA recognize a
pharmacist's right to conscience-based refusals, but require that pharma-
cists tell their employers of their objections to dispensing particular
medications, so that employers can make appropriate accommodations
for patients. 123 The APhA's House of Delegates amended the existing
policy to reflect the Committee's recommendations in 2004.124
As one example of the power of state pharmacy boards, Neil
Noesen faced a disciplinary hearing before Wisconsin's Pharmacy
Examining Board for his failure to transfer to another pharmacy or
return a prescription for oral contraceptives to the patient because of his
religious beliefs. 125 PFLI, who submitted an amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of Noesen, argued that Noesen's refusal did not cause the patient
hearing on charges of unprofessional conduct. The Wisconsin Department of Regulation and
Licensing could fine him or revoke his license.").
119. Am. PHARM. Ass'N, 1997-98 POLICY COMMIrEE REPORT: PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE
CLAUSE (1998).
120. Id. The decision of the pharmacy board would also be subject to judicial review. Id.
121. See, e.g., Stephanie E. Harvey et al., Do Pharmacists Have the Right to Refuse to
Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, http://www.nm-pharmacy.com/body-rights.
html (last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
122. Am. PHARM. Ass'N, supra note 119.
123. Id.
124, AM. PHARM. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE 2004 SESSION OF THE APHA HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2004) ("APhA recognizes the individual pharmacist's right to exercise conscientious refusal and
supports the establishment of systems to ensure patient's access to legally prescribed therapy
without compromising the pharmacist's right of conscientious refusal."), http://www.aphanet.org/
AMlTemplate.cfm?Section=search&section=aboutAPhA 1 &template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentFilelD=225.
125. Brief Amicus Curiae In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Neil Noesen,
R.Ph., by Pharmacists for Life Int'l in Support of Defendant, In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Neil T. Noesen, R.Ph., No. LS-0310091-PHM (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. 2005).
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any harm, as she was able to get her medication the next day, and
because "birth control pills . . . are not a medical necessity, since there
are other options for preventing birth."1 26 PFLI also argued that Noesen
has a protected freedom "to serve the Creator, and serve his fellow
humans according to the dictates of his conscience."'' 2 7 However, the
administrative law judge found that Noesen had violated the state ethics
code prohibiting a pharmacist from endangering "the health, welfare or
safety of a patient" by putting the patient at risk of an unwanted preg-
nancy through his refusal to dispense oral contraceptives or transfer or
return of the prescription to the patient.2 8 The judge recommended that
Noesen be reprimanded and required to attend ethics classes; the Phar-
macy Examining Board adopted the judge's proposed decision as its
final decision on April 13, 2005.129
The power of pharmacy licensing boards to require pharmacists to
fill valid prescriptions, even against the pharmacist's conscience, does
not violate the pharmacist's right of free exercise of religion. In
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 30 the
Supreme Court stated that an individual's religious beliefs do not
"excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate."1 31 Free exercise jurisprudence
allows the State to require individuals "to comply with a 'valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability"' even when such compliance conflicts
with the individual's religion.1 32 Only in cases in which "other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press" are
affected by the statute in question has the Court held that "a neutral,
generally applicable law" is barred by the First Amendment.
133
State licensing board rules requiring pharmacists to fill any valid
prescription would apply generally and neutrally to all pharmacists,
regardless of religious or moral beliefs.' 34 Such rules would not target
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen, R.Ph., No. LS-0310091-PHM
(Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. 2005), available at http://drl.wi.gov/dept/decisions/docs/0405070.
htm.
129. Id.
130. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
131. Id. at 878-79; cf Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
County, 85 P.3d 67, 76 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 53 (2004) (holding that a Catholic
employer was required to include women's prescription contraceptives in its health insurance plan
if the employer covered other prescription drugs, because the employer did not qualify as an
exempt religious employer under the California statute).
132. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)).
133. Id. at 881.
134. See Heather Rae Skeeles, Comment, Patient Autonomy Versus Religious Freedom:
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any particular religion, nor would any other constitutional right be at
stake to bar the application of the rule.' 35 However, if the rules required
a pharmacist to dispense medications without commenting on the con-
troversial nature of the drugs to the patient, the rule might be barred as
impeding the pharmacist's right of free speech.
D. Powerful Protection from Conscience Clauses
Even if there is currently insufficient protection for the pharma-
cist's right to refuse, conscience clauses have the potential to give phar-
macists ironclad protection against repercussions for following their
conscience. Conscience clauses are statutes or regulations that protect
health care employees from repercussions for refusal to participate in
health care services to which they are morally or religiously opposed.
1 36
Such clauses began appearing in federal and state law in the early
1970's, originally to protect recipients of federal funds from mandatory
participation in abortion or sterilization procedures conflicting with their
moral or religious beliefs. 137 Most states followed suit, adopting con-
science legislation protecting health care providers who refuse to pro-
vide services conflicting with their religious or moral beliefs.
38
A critical question with respect to such conscience clauses is
whether they extend to pharmacists who refuse to dispense oral contra-
ceptives, or whether they simply protect doctors and nurses who refuse
to participate in the provision of abortion services.' 39 Until 1998, no
state board of pharmacy had adopted a conscience clause explicitly
applicable to pharmacists. 140 South Dakota was the pioneer state; the
state's conscience clause applies specifically to pharmacists and protects
the pharmacist from "any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory
action against the pharmacist," as well as from any claims for damages
against the pharmacist, for a refusal to dispense any medication which
there is reason to believe "would be used to: (1) Cause an abortion; or
(2) Destroy an unborn child ...."I"
Arkansas, Mississippi and Georgia also explicitly allow pharma-
Should State Legislatures Require Catholic Hospitals to Provide Emergency Contraception to
Rape Victims?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1007, 1030 (2003).
135. Id.
136. Lynne D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 178 (1993).
137. Bassett, supra note 93, at 552-53.
138. Id. at 554.
139. See Herbe, supra note 87, at 97 ("As nearly all conscience statutes were enacted without
regard to pharmacists, these statutes are deficient in the context of pharmaceutical distribution of
reproductive medications in both their scope and protection.").
140. See Harvey et al., supra note 121.
141. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004).
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cists to refuse to dispense contraception. 4 2 Arkansas' statute states that
"[n]othing in this [Family Planning] subchapter shall prohibit a physi-
cian, pharmacist, or any other authorized paramedical personnel from
refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or informa-
tion . . "143 The Mississippi statute provides that "[a] health care pro-
vider has the right not to participate, and no health care provider shall be
required to participate in a health care service that violates his or her
conscience," 1" and explicitly includes pharmacists in the definition of
health care provider.145 The Georgia Code of Professional Conduct
states that "[i]t shall not be considered unprofessional conduct for any
pharmacist to refuse to fill any prescription based on his/her professional
judgment or ethical or moral beliefs."'
14 6
Other state conscience clauses either apply only to health care prov-
iders such as doctors and nurses, apply only to the provision of abortion
services, or are ambiguous as to whether pharmacists have a legal right
to conscientious refusal.' 47 For instance, Florida's conscience clause
family planning statutes "shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a phy-
sician or other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or fam-
ily planning service, supplies, or information for medical or religious
reasons; and the physician or other person shall not be held liable for
such refusal."' 48 The phrase "or other person" is sufficiently ambiguous
to discourage reliance by pharmacists.
Ambiguous state conscience clauses that do not explicitly protect
pharmacists who refuse to dispense contraceptives do not provide phar-
macists with much protection. Courts have interpreted conscience
clauses strictly, to exempt only those individuals and the conduct explic-
itly mentioned in statutes. "9 For example, a California court refused to
apply the California conscience clause in a case in which a private relig-
ious hospital refused to give a woman information about emergency
contraception (the "morning-after pill"), because the clause only applied
to provision of abortion services, and, the court held, the pill was not an
abortifacient. 150 Even if a pharmacist were able to convince a court that
142. TuE ALAN GUTITMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH
SERVICES (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibRPHS.
pdf.
143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
144. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (Supp. 2004).
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (Supp. 2004).
146. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03 (2001).
147. See Herbe, supra note 87, at 97-98; Wardle, supra note 136, at 178-85.
148. FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2004) (emphasis added).
149. See Bassett, supra note 93, at 555-58; Wardle, supra note 136, at 199-205.
150. Bassett, supra note 93, at 556 (citing Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256
Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1989)).
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oral contraceptives are abortifacients using the "post-fertilization effect"
argument,"' most conscience clauses only protect against "participation
or assistance in abortion."'' 52 Whether pharmacists who dispense drugs
that arguably induce abortions can be considered to have participated or
assisted in abortions remains an open question, although clearly, dispen-
sation of oral contraceptives might not be a significant enough act to
constitute participation or assistance in abortion.153
However, state conscience clauses that explicitly protect a pharma-
cist from being required to dispense any medication that violates his
conscience, such as the extremely broad Mississippi statute, 154 likely
provide ironclad protection for the refusing pharmacist. A court apply-
ing the Mississippi statute would likely apply the statute as strictly as
other conscience clauses have been applied, but in this case, to the bene-
fit of the refusing pharmacist. For example, a Montana court held that a
nurse-anesthetist who refused to participate in sterilization procedures
was protected by that state's conscience statute from being discharged
for her refusal, even where the employer hospital alleged that the
employee had participated in prior procedures, and the refusal created a
substantial burden for the employer.
155
In at least one case, however, a court has exhibited a desire to mini-
mize the absolute protection of a statute protecting pharmacists. In
Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami, 56 a Florida court found that the
state's conscience clause was evidence of a "policy permitting religious
practices to supercede or take priority over certain employment prac-
tices" and that the employer could not fire or discipline an employee for
exercising their religious beliefs.157 After reviewing court decisions
applying similar conscience statutes in other states, the Florida court
adopted "the requirement that an employer must reasonably accommo-
date an employee's religious practices unless he establishes that he
would suffer undue hardship," a requirement not contained in the lan-
guage of the Florida statute. 58 While the adoption of the undue hard-
ship exemption, borrowed from Title VII, would arguably make the
plaintiffs case more difficult, the court nonetheless held that the plain-
tiff nurse was entitled to reinstatement, unpaid wages, and damages for
151. See discussion supra pp. 2-3.
152. Herbe, supra note 87, at 99.
153. See id.
154. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5(1) (Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (Supp.
2004).
155. Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979).
156. 400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
157. Id. at 1267.
158. Id. at 1266.
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having been demoted by the employer hospital for her refusal to partici-
pate in abortions. 159 The court found that the employer had made. mini-
mal attempts to accommodate the nurse's religious beliefs, but that the
employer did not show that it would suffer undue hardship by making
further accommodations such as rearranging schedules.'
60
An employer who is subject to a state conscience statute that
explicitly protects pharmacists from forced dispensation of oral contra-
ceptives has little or no recourse when the employee pharmacist refuses
to dispense such medications to the detriment of the employer's busi-
ness. At best, the employer can hope that its state courts will adopt the
same "undue hardship" exemption adopted in Kenny, but even in that
situation, the burden will be on the employer to prove that it could not
accommodate the employee's objections without suffering a significant
burden. If the courts do not apply such an exemption for the employer,
then the employer will have to pay extra costs to ensure that a pharma-
cist who is willing to dispense oral contraceptives is available at all
times. Those who fail to take such measures not only run the risks of
incurring liability to female patients who are wrongfully denied their
rights, but also of losing customers.
IV. WHOSE RIGHT SHOULD PREVAIL?
What is the pharmacist's role in health care? Currently, a pharma-
cist is a necessary intermediary for women's access to oral contracep-
tives because oral contraceptives are not available without a
prescription. 16' A pharmacist's professional ethical duty is to protect
the patient's best interests.162 Therefore, a patient's interests have prior-
ity over the pharmacist's interests. A pharmacist "presented with a val-
idly authorized prescription for a legal medication, by a patient aware of
the risks involved in taking the medication, and for whom the medica-
tion would be reasonably safe," has "an ethical duty to fill and dispense
the prescription." 163 Pharmacists in such a position need to respect their
patient's autonomy. Instead, however, pharmacists who refuse to dis-
pense oral contraceptives place their concern for their own ethical auton-
omy above the autonomy of their patients.
One argument in support of this position has been levied against
religious hospitals that refuse to provide emergency contraception to
159. Id. at 1267.
160. Id. at 1266.
161. REPROD. HEALTH TECH. PROJECT & THE ALAN GUTMACHER INST., THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION IN CONTRACEPTION: CONVENIENCE, CONSUMER ACCESS AND CHOICE (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2004/09/20/UnfinRevInContra.pdf.
162. Herbe, supra note 87, at 87.
163. Id. at 88.
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rape victims. The argument suggests that such hospitals "waive the right
to ethical autonomy ...by engaging in monopolistic practices ...in
cases of traumatic intervention for victims of sexual assault, or when the
hospitals cease to be nonprofit corporations."'" This argument can be
extended to cover pharmacists working in for-profit settings. Accord-
ingly, such pharmacists have similarly waived the right to place their
ethical autonomy over their patients' rights to make their own choices
about their healthcare in concert with their physicians.
Women have a need, and arguably a right, 165 to reliable access to
birth control, both to control their fertility and for health reasons. 166 An
important question, then, is whether a pharmacist's refusal to dispense
oral contraceptives really creates an access problem. It is true, as PFLI
observes in its amicus brief for Neil Noesen, that the laws "are not
designed to protect [women] from feeling insulted" when they realize
that their "choice of elective medication is clinically and ethically con-
troversial.' 67 Where there are market alternatives available, such as in
a city with a large number of pharmacies and pharmacists who might
not object to filling a prescription for oral contraceptives, perhaps the
problem is not really access, but inconvenience. However, a pharma-
cist's refusal to dispense oral contraceptives can be particularly devastat-
ing in rural areas, and to populations of women who have limited access
due to other factors.
168
According to a study of family planning service provision in rural
Washington, twenty-four percent of U.S. residents live in rural areas.
169
In such areas, "access to health care is often limited by provider
shortages, by the absence of local services, by lack of transportation and
by economic factors."17 The study noted that there are some rural areas
in Washington that have no access to local family planning clinics.1
71
While access to family planning clinics can only serve as a proxy for
164. Bassett, supra note 93, at 583.
165. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
166. Bollinger, supra note 10 (noting that oral contraceptives are also prescribed for reasons
other than contraception, such as treatment of endometriosis and fibroids).
167. See Brief Amicus Curiae In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Neil Noesen,
R.Ph., by Pharmacists for Life Int'l in Support of Defendant, supra note 125.
168. See Gardner, supra note 118 (quoting Lisa Boyce, vice president of public affairs for
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, criticizing Wal-Mart's decision not to stock emergency
contraception because "'many rural communities only have one pharmacy,' . . . 'so you only have
one pharmacist. Or the next pharmacy is miles away.'").
169. Sharon A. Dobie et al., Family Planning Service Provision in Rural Areas: A Survey in
Washington State, FAm. PLAN. PERSP., May-June 1998, at 139.
170. Id. The article further notes that "[o]f the 30 poorest health service areas in the state, 25
were rural. Of the 53 rural health service areas, 25 reported primary care provider shortages ... 
Id. at 141.
171. Id. at 142.
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women's access to contraceptives, such clinics serve "[o]ne-third of all
women seeking contraceptive services" and "nearly two-thirds of low-
income and teenage women."'
72
Even in those cases where a pharmacist's refusal constitutes a mere
inconvenience to the patient, an employer should be able to ensure that
patients bringing prescriptions to its pharmacy have their legal prescrip-
tions filled without hesitation (subject to the pharmacist's professional
health-related judgment). Requiring employer pharmacies to do more
than make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious or other
objections imposes on the employer too great a burden in terms of lost
customer goodwill, as the patient will likely perceive the pharmacy itself
to be rejecting her prescription and finding her choice of contraception
morally objectionable.
Both patients and employers need a repeal or revision of overly-
permissive conscience clauses to strike a balance between the rights of
pharmacists and their customers and employers. States should stop
reacting to conservative pressure to pass these conscience clauses and
should more carefully consider the impact that these new protections for
pharmacists will have on women's right of access to contraception. Cal-
ifornia is a progressive example; legislators are trying to pass a law that
would require pharmacists to dispense oral contraceptives when
presented with a valid prescription.173
In the absence of individual states recognizing that permissive con-
science clauses threaten access to oral contraceptives and thus the right
of reproductive choice, Congress could pre-empt such state conscience
clauses by enacting a federal statute requiring pharmacists to fill valid,
legal prescriptions regardless of their individual objections, or allowing
pharmacies to discipline employee pharmacists who refuse to do so. 74
Such pre-emption would be valid under Congress's Commerce Clause
1 75
power, as oral contraceptives are distributed nationally (even globally)
and are part of the stream of interstate commerce.
176
172. Id. at 139.
173. Harrison Sheppard, Bill Would Require Birth Control Sales, DAILY NEWS (Los Angeles),
Dec. 31, 2004, at N5.
174. Elizabeth Tobin, Note, Blurring the Line Separating Church and State: California
Exposes the Inherent Problems of Charitable Choice, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1647 (2002)
(stating that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law pre-empts state law where "a federal law
and a state law exist in a related field or create a conflict in their application").
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
176. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005) (holding that Congress has the
power to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and possession of medical marijuana by intrastate
growers and users, and stating that "[f]irst, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has the power
to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." (citations omitted)).
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Another possible solution to the potential negative effects on access
to oral contraceptives from pharmacist refusals to dispense such contra-
ceptives is for the Food and Drug Administration to give at least some
oral contraceptives over-the-counter (OTC) status.1 77 However, this
solution raises concerns that unlinking oral contraceptives from the
requirement of a prescription would lead to women foregoing the annual
medical examination most prescribers require as a prerequisite to pre-
scribing the drugs 7 8 While these concerns are probably exaggerated,
79
this solution presents other problems, including that OTC status means
that these drugs would no longer be covered by prescription drug insur-
ance, making them less affordable for women whose prescription contra-
ceptives are currently covered by health insurance. 180 Additionally, it is
possible that the latest innovations in contraception initially would be
available by prescription only, 1' leaving the possibility that the most
effective products would still be accessible only through those pharma-
cists who do not refuse to fill such prescriptions.
While the recent trend in conscience clauses is to expand protection
to encompass pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for religious or
moral reasons, 182 there is cause for hope in a bill introduced in the
House of Representative by Representatives Carolyn Maloney (D-NY),
Christopher Shays (R-CT), Debbie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL), and
Joseph Crowley (D-NY). '83 If passed, the Access to Legal Pharmaceuti-
cals Act would require that when a pharmacist refuses to dispense a
legally prescribed medication, the pharmacy ensures another pharmacist
fill the prescription without delay.' 84 The proposed bill also prohibits a
refusing pharmacist from interfering with the customer's efforts to get
the prescription filled, such as by refusing to return the prescription to
the customer, refusing to transfer the prescription if the customer
177. See REPROD. HEALTH TECH. PROJECT & THE ALAN GuTTMACHER INST., supra note 161.
178. Id. at 3-4.
179. Id. at 3 ("Although there is a lack of consensus, it is worth noting that a handful of experts
contend that most contraceptive options-with the exception of the IUD-are appropriate
candidates for a switch [to OTC status].").
180. See id. at 4.
181. See W. Steven Pray & Joshua J. Pray, How Medications Gain FDA-Approved OTC
Status, U.S. PHARMACIST, Oct. 2003, at 10, available at http://www.uspharmacist.com/index.asp?
show=article&page=8_1149.htm.
182. See generally Bryan A. Dykes, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding to
Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REv. 565 (2002); Gloria Feldt,
Whose Conscience?, ToMPAINE.COM, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.tompaine.com/articles/whose-
conscience.php.
183. See Press Release, Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney, D-N.Y., On 40th Anniversary of Supreme
Court Birth Control Decision, Some Women Have Seen Their Rights Vanish (June 7, 2005), http:/
/www.house.gov/Maloney/press/109th/20050607Griswold.htm.
184. Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005).
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requests a transfer, harassing or intimidating the customer, or breaching
the customer's medical confidentiality. M The bill would also create a
private cause of action for the aggrieved patient, with provision for
actual and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and
costs. 186
While a federal law preempting state conscience clauses would
resolve many of the problems addressed in this article, it seems unlikely
such a law will be enacted. If anything, the results of the 2004 presiden-
tial election are evidence of increased political conservativism and the
heightened power of the religious right to affect policy.187 In 2005
alone, legislation that would expand conscience protection to pharma-
cists has been introduced in states including Arizona, Indiana, Michigan,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont.
188
Perhaps the real problem is the public's lack of awareness of these
laws and their repercussions. Most Americans are supportive of the use
of oral contraceptives, and 95 percent of American women use some
form of birth control at some point in their lives.189 Fortunately, the
popular press is bringing needed attention to this topic by reaching out
to the population whose rights are most endangered-young women.' 90
Perhaps greater attention to this growing trend and its potential ramifica-
tions for reproductive choice is needed to spur debate on the proper lim-
its of pharmacists' power to control access to oral contraceptives. At the
very least, women, and the men with whom they share responsibility for
controlling their fertility, should be aware of this threat so they have a
chance to protest before they lose an important right.
V. CONCLUSION
Are these pharmacists' attacks of conscience mere isolated events,
or are they part of an organized effort to deprive women of the ability to
exercise reproductive choice? Pro-choice commentators have
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See generally PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED. OF AM., INC., A PLANNED PARENTHOOD
REPORT ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND ITS ALLIES: THE ASSAULT ON BIRTH CONTROL AND
FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS (2003), http://www.plannedparenthoodnj.org/library/files/79
assaultonb.pdf.
188. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED. OF AM., INC., STATE By STATE ACTION: SUMMARY OF
STATE ACTIONS RELATED TO PHARMACIST REFUSALS (2005), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
pp2/ponal/files/portal/media/factsreports/fact-050418-pharmacist-refusals.xml.
189. Bollinger, supra note 10.
190. See, e.g., Susan Bakos, Is Your Sex Life Being Censored?, MARIE CLAIRE, Oct. 2004, at
183, 186 (asking "Is Your Pharmacist Crossing Lines?" and listing the states in which legislation
to allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for RU-486 and the morning-after pill has been
either enacted or proposed).
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denounced the pharmacists' actions as part of a general, conservative
attack on women's access to abortion and control of their own fertil-
ity.'91 The Bush administration's policies on health funding and sex
education reflect attempts to limit access not just to abortion but also to
birth control, including condoms. 9 z Behind these restrictions on the
means through which women exercise reproductive choice looms the
larger issue of controlling sexuality in general.
19 3
These incidents of pharmacists' refusals to dispense oral contracep-
tives seem to be on the rise, 194 possibly because of the concerted efforts
of organized anti-choice groups such as Pharmacists for Life Interna-
tional. Groups that traditionally fought against access to abortion are
now extending the anti-abortion argument to encompass oral contracep-
tives. "'95 The refusing pharmacists also have legal assistance now, as
organizations such as the Liberty Legal Institute 196 and the American
Center for Law and Justice' 97 have begun to litigate on behalf of refus-
ing pharmacists.
This trend indicates an urgent need to protect a woman's right to
control her own fertility, and particularly a need to protect choice at a
preventative level. Surely, pro-life and pro-choice activists should be
able to agree that prevention of unintended pregnancies is a desirable
result. 198 Women need to have access to oral contraceptives for their
right to use contraceptives to be a real right, and not just a nominal one.
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